APA
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Ker, A., Barnett, B., Jacques, D., & Tolhurst, T. (2017). Canadian Business Risk Management: Private firms, crown corporations, and public institutions. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 64(4), 591–612. https://doi.org/10.1111/cjag.12144
Chicago/Turabian
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Ker, A., B. Barnett, D. Jacques, and T. Tolhurst. “Canadian Business Risk Management: Private Firms, Crown Corporations, and Public Institutions.” Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 64, no. 4 (2017): 591–612.
MLA
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Ker, A., et al. “Canadian Business Risk Management: Private Firms, Crown Corporations, and Public Institutions.” Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 64, no. 4, 2017, pp. 591–612, doi:10.1111/cjag.12144.
BibTeX Click to copy
@article{a2017a,
title = {Canadian Business Risk Management: Private firms, crown corporations, and public institutions},
year = {2017},
issue = {4},
journal = {Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics},
pages = {591-612},
volume = {64},
doi = {10.1111/cjag.12144},
author = {Ker, A. and Barnett, B. and Jacques, D. and Tolhurst, T.}
}
This paper considers the current and possible institutions (programs, policies, participants, etc.) that govern public Business Risk Management (BRM) in Canada. This is an important policy topic for two reasons: BRM spending accounts for the vast majority of public monies funneled to Canadian agricultural producers and the upcoming Canadian Agricultural Partnership includes a mandated BRM review and thus presents an opportunity to change these institutions in meaningful ways. We pay particular attention to the rhetoric surrounding greater involvement of private insurance, the lack of rhetoric regarding the use of crown corporations, and issues of subsidization. We conclude with policy recommendations favoring commodity-specific revenue versus whole-farm net margin insurance, a possible reduction in subsidy levels, and a call to reconsider the role of crown corporations. We also make programming recommendations regarding the discontinued use of private reinsurance, a reduction in the level of program reserves, and greater transparency.
Ce document examine les institutions actuelles et potentielles (programmes, politiques, participants, etc.) qui gouvernent la gestion des risques d'entreprises (GRE) au Canada. Deux raisons rendent important ce sujet politique : les depenses liees a la GRE totalisent la grande majorite des fonds publics accordes aux producteurs agricoles, et le futur cadre politique agricole offre l'occasion de modifier ces institutions de maniere significative. Nous portons une attention particuliere a la rhetorique entourant l'implication plus soutenue des assurances privees, a l'absence de rhetorique au sujet de l'utilisation de societes d'Etat, et aux enjeux de subvention. Nous concluons avec des recommandations politiques favorisant les assurances de revenus provenant specifiquement de produits agricoles versus celles de la marge nette de l'exploitation globale, une potentielle reduction des niveaux de subvention, et un appel a tenir compte du role des societes d'Etat. Nous proposons aussi des recommandations de programmation concernant l'arret de l'utilisation des reassurances privees, une reduction du niveau des programmes de reserve, et une transparence accrue.